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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MENTAL HEALTH - A PATIENT IN-
VOLUNTARILY CIVILLY COMMITTED TO A STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL
HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TREATMENT.
Donaldson v. O'Connor (5th Cir. 1974)
Plaintiff Donaldson, adjudged a paranoid schizophrenic in a civil com-
mitment proceeding,1 was involuntarily committed to a state mental hospital
where he remained confined for over 14 years, 2 "receiving no commonly
accepted psychiatric treatment," and only a minimal level of custodial care.3
On February 24, 1971, before his release, Donaldson filed suit under the
Civil Rights Act of 18714 (section 1983) against five hospital and state
mental health officials, claiming deprivation of what he alleged to be his
fourteenth amendment right to be treated or released. 5 A jury trial in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida resulted
in a judgment of $38,500 in punitive and compensatory damages against
the plaintiff's two attending physicians.6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
holding that a nondangerous patient, involuntarily civilly committed to a
1. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 509 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
171 (1974) (No. 74-8).
2. As of 1969, Donaldson had unsuccessfully presented his claims for release to
state and federal courts 12 times. See Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEo.
L.J. 752, 775 (1969). The Supreme Court had denied Donaldson habeas corpus relief
four times. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 400 U.S. 869 (1970) ; Donaldson v. O'Connor,
390 U.S. 971 (1968) ; Donaldson v. Florida, 371 U.S. 806 (1963) ; In re Donaldson,
364 U.S. 808 (1960).
3. 493 F.2d at 509, 511. Donaldson was confined in a room where there were
60 beds and where one-third of the inmates were criminals. Id. at 511. During the
first 10 years of his confinement, Donaldson received a total of 3 hours of psychiatric
counseling. Id. at 514. The court concluded:
Donaldson received only the kind of subsistence level custodial care he would have
received in a prison, and perhaps less psychiatric treatment than a criminally com-
mitted inmate would have received.
Id. at 512.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 (section 1983) is
codified as section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code and provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
5. 493 F.2d at 509-10. Plaintiff originally brought this suit as a class action
on behalf of all the patients in his ward against five hospital and state mental health
officials, seeking habeas corpus relief, damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief.
Id. at 512. After his release on July 31, 1971, and after the dismissal of the suit as a
class action, he filed an amended complaint seeking individual damages. Id. He alleged
that the conduct which deprived him of his constitutional rights was the malicious and
willful confining of him against his will, with the knowledge that he was not dangerous
to himself or others, that he was not receiving treatment, and that his hospitalization
would be prolonged without treatment, and the intentional limitation of his treatment
program to custodial care. Id. at 513.
6. Id. at 510. The opinion of the district court was not reported.
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state mental hospital, has a fourteenth amendment right to receive treat-
ment adequate at least to help him to improve his mental condition, and
that defendants had violated this right both by denying the plaintiff grounds
privileges, occupational therapy, and consultations with his attending psy-
chiatrists, and by preventing other responsible agencies from aiding him
in his attempt to secure release. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507
(5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 171 (1974) (No. 74-8).
The notion that a mental patient has a right to receive treatment
while institutionalized is a recently developed one. Its origin has been
credited to an article published in the American Bar Association Journal
in 1960.7 Although at that time there existed no case law requiring a
public mental hospital to provide adequate psychiatric and medical treat-
ment to a patient whom the state had involuntarily committed s the right
to treatment has since developed a substantial legal foundation, initially
through statutory interpretation, and more recently through the forma-
tion of a constitutional theory.
In the landmark case of Rouse v. Cameron,9 which involved the level
of treatment a patient received while confined in a federal mental hospital
as a result of his being acquitted of a criminal charge by reason of in-
sanity, 10 the District of Columbia Circuit declared that the petitioner had
a right to treatment cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding.1' Specifically,
the court determined that this right could be satisfied by a bona fide effort
to provide treatment which was adequate in the light of present medical
knowledge, and suggested that contacts with a psychiatrist and activities
with the hospital staff were required.1 2 While this right was not consti-
tutionally based, as it was derived from a unique reading of a District of
Columbia mental health statute,'1 3 there was considerable dicta as to a
possible constitutional foundation for a patient's right to treatment.
14
7. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960). Dr. Birnbaum
has been called the "father of the idea of a right to treatment." See 493 F.2d at 520.
8. Legal authority at the time was primarily concerned with ensuring that those
committed were sufficiently mentally ill to require confinement, and that they were
confined in mental rather than penal institutions. See, e.g., Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d
780 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958). See
generally Birnbaum, supra note 7, at 502.
9. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
10. Id. at 452. Petitioner in Rouse sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground
that he should be released because he was not being treated. Id. For an analysis of
the importance of the Rouse decision in the judicial development of the right to
treatment, see Robitscher, The Right to Psychiatric Treatment, 18 VILL. L. REV. 11,
14-18 (1972).
11. 373 F.2d at 458-59.
12. Id. at 456. If this standard of treatment were not met by the hospital, the
court indicated that it could release the petitioner. However, immediate release was
not mandated, because the court found that it had the alternative of giving the hospital
an opportunity to improve its therapeutic conditions. !d. at 458-59.
13. Mentally Ill Act of 1964, D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1967). Similar wording
in statutes in other jurisdictions had never been interpreted to include a right to certain
standards of treatment. Robitscher, supra note 10, at 17.
14. 373 F.2d at 453. Rouse stated that the absence of treatment after commitment
raised questions of due process and cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts made the next major
contribution to the development of a legal right to treatment in Nason v.
Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp.15 In a situation involving
the care an individual was receiving in a public mental institution after
having been committed due to his incompetence to stand trial, 16 the Nason
court stated that confinement of the mentally ill not convicted of a crime
would raise a serious question of deprivation of liberty without due process
of law if treatment were not provided.1
7
Since Rouse and Nason concerned only mental patients committed
after criminal proceedings, those decisions did not reach the issue of
whether a right to treatment existed on behalf of the individuals who
were also in need of some legal guarantee of treatment - the patients who
were civilly committed.' 8 Recently, however, the constitutional rights of
a civilly committed mental patient were considered in two cases originating
in the federal district courts of the Fifth Circuit, Wyatt v. Stickney 9 and
Burnham v. Department of Public Health.
20
Relying upon dicta in Rouse and Covington v. Harris,2' Wyatt held
that when a mental patient was committed to a mental institution for treat-
ment purposes, he unquestionably had a constitutional right to receive a
level of individual treatment that would give him a realistic opportunity
15. 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
16. Id. at 605, 233 N.E.2d at 909.
17. Id. at 612, 233 N.E.2d at 913. The Nason court also raised the possibility
that the petitioner's confinement would be a violation of the equal protection clause if
treatment were not provided on a reasonable, nondiscriminatory basis. Id. at 612,
233 N.E.2d at 913.
18. Dr. Birnbaum did not consider Rouse an appropriate vehicle for the realiza-
tion of his concept of the right to treatment because the petitioner in Rouse was a
sociopath detained for the purpose of imprisonment and was not a typical case of
hospital neglect. Robitscher, supra note 10, at 15, citing Address by Morton Birnbaum,
Annual Meeting of American Psychiatric Association, May 8, 1967, at 21.
19. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), upon submission of proposed standards by
defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.
Ala.), enforced as to additional plaintiffs, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd
sub nor. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
20. 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974),
petition for cert. filed sub nori. Department of Human Resources v. Burnham, 43
U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975) (No. 74-904). Burnhain was a class action
brought by several mental patients in a state hospital alleging inadequate treatment
and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Acts of 1870
and 1871. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970). 349 F. Supp. at 1336-37. For a discussion
of decisions from district courts in other circuits that have considered the issue, see
notes 52-55 & 61-66 and accompanying text infra.
21. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Covington, using as a basis for its decision
the same statute used in Rouse (see note 13 supra), limited the review of therapeutic
programs to a consideration of whether the hospital administrators had made a rea-
soned decision by employing the proper criteria without overlooking anything of sub-
stantial relevance. 419 F.2d at 621.
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to be cured or to improve his mental condition.2 2 However, the court
failed to offer any supporting rationale.
In Burnham, the court rejected Wyatt, holding that one has no con-
stitutional right to treatment.23 It stated that the Wyatt court erred in
relying upon dicta in Rouse and Covington, and that the question of a
patient's right to treatment was a matter of state law.
24
While the Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled directly
upon the question, in another context it recently adopted the reasoning of
the cases which had found a constitutional right to treatment. In Jackson
v. Indiana,25 the Court held that confinement based solely upon a lack of
capacity to stand trial could last no longer than the period reasonably
necessary to determine whether the person confined would attain com-
petence to stand trial in the future.20  The Court announced that due
process required that the nature and duration of confinement of the men-
tally ill have some reasonable relation to the purpose for which they
were committed.
2 7
Thus, the Donaldson court was the first federal court of appeals to con-
sider the constitutional right of a civilly committed mental patient to treat-
ment and the first to declare unequivocally that such a right existed.28 As
such it is the furthest development in the legal right of mental patients to
receive treatment.
At the foundation of the court's analysis was the principle that because
civil commitment is such a "massive curtailment of liberty," it brings into
play the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 29 Using
this basic principle, the Donaldson court then developed a two-part theory
of a constitutional right to treatment.
30
First, the court adopted a substantive due process analysis based upon
the settled rule that any serious abridgment of a freedom protected by the
fourteenth amendment must be justified by some permissible governmental
22. 325 F. Supp. at 784. Two other district courts, relying upon Wyatt, have
declared that a constitutional right to treatment exists: Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp.
487 (D. Minn. 1974); and Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
23. 349 F. Supp. at 1341.
24. Id.
25. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Jackson concerned a mentally defective mute who was
committed after being determined incompetent to stand trial for criminal charges.
Id. at 717-19.
26. Id. at 738.
27. Id.
28. 493 F.2d at 519. The Wyatt and Burnhamn cases were affirmed and reversed
on appeal, respectively, by the Fifth Circuit to conform with the Donaldson decision.
See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Burnham v. Department of
Pub. Health, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974).
29. 493 F.2d at 520, citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). Humphrey
stated that the nonpenal commitment of a sex offender in lieu of a criminal sentence
was a "massive curtailment of liberty." 405 U.S. at 509. Donaldson suggested that
civil commitment might be a greater abridgment of freedom than penal confinement
because of the stigma and the indefinite period which accompany it. 493 F.2d at 520.
30. The finding of a constitutional right was necessary to the adjudication of the
section 1983 claim, because only the deprivation of a federal right gives rise to a cause
of action under this section. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 4 supra.
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goal.3 l Having established that civil commitment is an abridgment of free-
dom within the scope of the due process clause, the court reviewed the
three permissible governmental goals traditionally offered to justify civil
commitment: commitment for the protection of others, commitment for
the protection of self, and commitment for the purpose of treatment.
32
The court noted that the use of commitment for the purpose of treat-
ment is based upon a parens patriae rationale.33 This well-established
common law doctrine holds the state responsible for the care and custody
of all persons incompetent to care for themselves; in exercising this re-
sponsibility, the state may utilize involuntary commitments.3 4 On the other
hand, commitment for the protection of others is an exercise of the state's
police power in furthering a societal interest.3 5 Both doctrines have differ-
ent constitutional ramifications, owing to their different theoretical bases.3 6
The court held that when parens patriae is the only rationale asserted
to justify confinement, as it was for the plaintiff in the instant case, the
due process clause requires that adequate treatment actually be provided.
3 7
While relying upon Wyatt and Nason in reaching this conclusion,38 the
court specifically applied the test used by the Supreme Court in Jackson
which required that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purposes for which the individual was com-
mitted.3 9 The Donaldson court reasoned that if the purpose of the com-
mitment were treatment, and treatment were not provided, then the nature
of the commitment had no reasonable relation to its purpose, and was
31. 493 F.2d at 520, citing Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973). As an analytical doc-
trine, substantive due process has been condemned by the Supreme Court as a device
used by the judiciary to substitute its own social and economic beliefs for the judg-
ment of the legislature. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-31 (1963). However,
the doctrine was recently employed by the Supreme Court itself in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). Donaldson cited authority to indicate that this doctrine is again
gaining respect. 493 F.2d at 520 n.17, citing, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935 & n.91.
32. 493 F.2d at 520, citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737.
33. 493 F.2d at 521. The parens patriae power of the state has been recognized
since 1845. See Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1209 nn.55-56 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments in
the Law] and cases cited therein.
34. Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1208.
35. States possess the plenary power to make laws and regulations for the pro-
tection of the public health, safety, welfare, and morals. Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1904). See Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1222.
36. Compare note 40 and accompanying text infra with note 41 and accompany-
ing text infra.
37. 493 F.2d at 521.
38. Id. at 521, quoting Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala.
1971), and Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital, 353 Mass. 604,
612, 233 N.E.2d 908, 913. The Wyatt court had concluded:
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the
confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then to fail to provide adequate
treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process.
325 F. Supp. at 785.
39. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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thus an arbitrary exercise of governmental power in violation of the due
process clause.
40
This substantive due process analysis is subject to one important limi-
tation. Standing alone, the substantive due process approach is meaningful
only when the sole basis for involuntary commitment is the individual's
need for treatment. When the protection of society from the danger of
the individual is the basis for commitment, treatment would not be re-
quired by the court's analysis because incarceration without therapeutic
care would fulfill the Jackson requirement that the nature of the commit-
ment bear some reasonable relation to its purpose.
41
Presumably as an attempt to overcome this limitation of the substan-
tive due process theory, the court adopted a quid pro quo theory which, it
asserted, is applicable regardless of whether the state's rationale for con-
finement is parens patriae or its police power. 42 The court noted that long
term detention of an individual had been permitted only when the major
limitations upon the exercise of government power had been indulged.
These limitations number three: First, an individual may be confined only
if given a hearing subject to the "rigorous constitutional limitations" of
the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Second,
the individual must have been proven to have committed a specific crime
against the state. And finally, the period of time for which the state may
confine him must be definite.43 The court stated that when any of these
three limitations was not observed, the quid pro quo theory required that
the state give the individual something in exchange to justify his confine-
ment, 44 noting that the consideration traditionally recognized as sufficient
had been the provision of rehabilitative treatment.
45
40. 493 F.2d at 521.
41. See Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134, 1141 (1967).
42. 493 F.2d at 521. Since the basis for the commitment of the appellee in
Donaldson was his need for treatment, there was no need for the court to formulate
a right to treatment applicable when a person is committed because he is considered
dangerous. This dictum concerning the quid pro quo theory indicated a concern for
supplying a constitutional doctrine to future courts having to rule upon the confine-
ment of a mental patient committed for reasons other than, or in addition to, his need
for treatment.
43. Id. at 522.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 522-25. The court cited a wide range of precedent in support of the
quid pro quo theory, delineating five major categories illustrative of the development
of the concept that treatment must be offered if a person is to be confined without the
privileges that precede and accompany penal confinement. The first group had pro-
hibited confinement in a prison when the detention was nonpenal in theory. See, e.g.,
Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass.
313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1958); In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958).
The second group had held that when detention was nonpenal in theory, confinement
must be in a place where conditions were actually therapeutic. See, e.g., Ragsdale v.
Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 517,
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 407 U.S. 355 (1972); Commonwealth v.
Page, supra. The cases in the third category had held that a nonpenal confinement
statute could be considered constitutional only if the statutory promise of rehabilitative
treatment were realized. See, e.g., Sas v. Maryland, supra. The fourth group had
held that a mental patient had a right to a hearing of a claim that he was not receiv- 6
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Of the three elements of the quid pro quo analysis, the one most ade-
quately supported by case law is that which requires the state to offer
the individual treatment if it is going to confine him without his having
committed a specific act. While Donaldson did not elaborate upon this
point, it did cite Powell v. Texas,46 where the Supreme Court held that
before a person may be criminally punished, he must have actually engaged
in some behavior society has an interest in preventing, as otherwise his
incarceration would be in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments' proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.47 Presumably, the
Fifth Circuit relied upon Powell for the proposition that if the state were
to confine a mentally ill person and provide him with only the custodial
care given to a prisoner, as a result of his mental illness he would suffer
penal consequences which would constitute cruel and inhuman punishment.
48
Another Supreme Court decision, neither discussed nor referred to
in Donaldson, Robinson v. California,49 lends further support to this aspect
of the quid pro quo theory. Holding that a drug addict may not be punished
merely for possessing the status -of "addict,"' ° the Robinson Court declared
ing treatment. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966): Nason v.
Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
The fifth line of cases were class actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
requiring that adequate treatment be provided in state institutions. See, e.g., Welsch
v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974) ; Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686
(N.D. II1. 1973) ; Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Contra,
Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd,
503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed sub norm. Department of Human
Resources v. Burnham, 43 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975) (No. 74-904). An
illustrative example of the cases cited is Commonwealth v. Page, supra. There, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized that because a statute providing
for the treatment of the mentally ill was nonpenal, a jury trial was not constitutionally
required. 339 Mass. at 316, 159 N.E.2d at 85. The court declared that if treatment
were not offered, the statute could not be sustained as a nonpenal statute. Id. at 317,
159 N.E.2d at 85. Thus, the Page court recognized that the constitutionality of a
commitment statute not providing for the rigorous proceedings of a criminal trial
rested upon the quid pro quo of treatment's being offered.
After giving the right to treatment a constitutional basis, Donaldson secured
this right by its disposition of the lesser issues involved in the appeal. The court
declared that there was only a qualified official immunity for conduct giving rise to a
cause of action under section 1983. See note 74 infra. Following many of the cases
that have recognized a legal right to treatment, the Fifth Circuit also held that the
lack of facilities and personnel did not justify a deprivation of this legal right. Id.
at 527. See Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 497-98 (D. Minn. 1974) ; Rouse v.
Covington, 373 F.2d 451, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971). The Donaldson court did, however, imply that the lack of re-
sources should be considered when the decision is made whether or not to continue the
confinement of the patient committed under the parens patriae principle. 493 F.2d at
527. The court also disposed of several other collateral issues not relevant to the
impact of a constitutional right to treatment. Id. at 525-31.
46. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
47. Id. at 533. See U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV § 1.
48. A state might attempt to justify this confinement upon the basis of the
necessity for confinement to prevent the patient from committing future acts against
the state. By definition, this theory of detention is punitive, not therapeutic.
Symposium - The Right to Treatment, 57 Gpo. L.J. 673, 694 (1969).
49. 370 U.S. 660 (1961).
50. Id. at 666-67.
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in a dictum that while a state may confine the mentally ill for treatment,
it would be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment for a state to
make mental illness a criminal offense.51 By virtue of the same analysis,
it would seem to follow that if a mental patient were confined solely because
he was mentally ill, an argument could be made that he, like the drug
addict in Robinson, was being punished for his status.
Donaldson is n6t the first case to apply the eighth amendment rationale
to the civil commitment of the mentally ill. The court in Welsch v. Likins5 2
a class action brought against Minnesota state hospitals by several mentally
retarded patients for the purpose of having their treatment rights declared
and enforced under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, took this approachya
Welsch held that patients had a constitutional right to treatment 54 and
based this right partially upon the Robinson proscription of punishing a
person for his status.r5
Of the cases refusing to recognize a constitutional right to treatment,
the one closest in point to Donaldson is Burnham v. Department of Public
Health,5 6 in which the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
held that there was no right to treatment conferred by the Constitution
because, while the fourteenth amendment guaranteed equal protection of
the law, it gave rise to no rights in itself.5 7 Admitting that the state had
set up institutions for the purpose of treating the mentally ill,58 the court
declared further that not every government service gave rise to individual
rights.5 9 However, this approach may be unsound because it ignores the
application of the due process clause to deprivations of liberty which result
from involuntary commitments. 60
Another recent case declining to recognize a. constitutional right to
treatment, New York State Association for Retarded Children v. Rocke-
feller6 (NYSARC) involved an action, brought on behalf of the residents
of a state institution for the mentally retarded, which sought to force the
51. Id. at 666.
52. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
53. Id. at 496.
54. Id. at 499.
55. Id. at 496. In Welsch the court observed that patients who were civilly com-
mitted were not criminals but victims of an uncontrollable status. Id.
56. 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying
text supra, and note 28 supra.
57. 349 F. Supp. at 1339. The Burnham court also dismissed the class action
because of its lack of jurisdiction due to the eleventh amendment, the nonjusticiable
character of the concept of adequate treatment, and the existence of adequate remedies
at law. Id.
58. Id. at 1338.
59. Id. at 1339. The court analogized the statutory provision for treatment to
that for education, and quoted Fleming v. Adams, 377 F.2d 975, 977 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967), which indicated that a state is not constitutionally re-
quired to provide education for its citizens. 349 F. Supp. at 1339.
60. The Fifth Circuit reversed Burnham on appeal. See note 28 supra.
61. 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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state to provide better treatment for the residents. 62 NYSARC, like Burn-
ham, found that there was no specific constitutional provision which im-
posed a duty upon a state to provide services to its citizens.6 3 However,
NYSARC declared in dicta that when a person was committed by the
operation of a statute which expressed the purpose of treatment, as was
the case in Donaldson,6 4 the person would have the right to be released if
treatment were not given. 65
Unlike the plaintiffs in NYSARC, Donaldson had been denied re-
lease several times during his confinement. 6 This factual distinction is
significant, because if the confined patient is given release upon request,
his confinement is not the same massive curtailment of liberty that the
patient's was in Donaldson.
Thus, in light of Powell, Robinson, and Welsch, the Donaldson con-
clusion that the state must offer the civilly committed person something
in addition to mere custodial confinement appears sound. The narrow
scope of the Burnham analysis and the factual distinction in NYSARC
would seem to indicate that these cases do not operate to undermine the
Donaldson analysis.
The inclusion of the quid pro quo doctrine was essential to the forma-
tion of an effective right to treatment for all involuntarily civilly committed
patients. Although the plaintiff in the instant case had been committed
upon the basis of his need for treatment and, therefore, was protected
under the court's substantive due process approach, others committed upon
the grounds that they were dangerous to others would not be so protected
in the absence of a quid pro quo theory.1
7
The addition of the latter theory is especially significant in view of
the fact that fear of the dangerousness of the mentally ill is a factor in-
volved in many state involuntary commitment procedures. Dangerousness
is an express concern in many statutes, and the most recent statutory
enactments indicate a trend toward making it the only basis for involun-
tary civil commitments." Even where the statutory basis for commitment
is the need for treatment, the fear of the dangerousness of the mentally ill
is often an unexpressed factor in the decision to confine., 9
62. Id. at 755. The plaintiffs sought to require the implementation of programs
which would raise to national accreditation standards the conditions at a state school
for the mentally retarded. Id.
63. Id. at 761, citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
64. 493 F.2d at 521.
65. 357 F. Supp. at 762. The court held that while no right to state services
could be enforced in a federal court, a right to release could be. Id.
66. 493 F.2d at 515-17. See note 2 supra.
67. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
68. Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1203-05. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28:52-53 (Supp. 1974) ; MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 38-208 (1961) ; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:26 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.6 (1974).
69. R. ROCK, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 6-7 (1968).
This American Bar Foundation survey found that the standard of dangerousness
is widely observed in practice if not in theory. Id. See N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO
BE DIFFERENT 80 (1971). Involuntary commitments serve multiple purposes: the
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The widespread failure to require a finding of incapacity prior to the
involuntary commitment proceeding also indicates an overriding interest
in the protection of society. 70 If a state were concerned primarily with
the welfare of the mentally ill, it would let the individual make a voluntary
decision to commit himself. 71 In contrast, an involuntary commitment
would be permissible only if the subject thereof were incapable of making
the decision. However, only a minority of the states require a finding of
incapacity prior to involuntary commitment. 72
It is clear that a theory limited in its application to commitments
based solely upon the individual's need for treatment would have a con-
comitantly limited effect. However, when the substantive due process
approach is considered in conjunction with the second part of the Donaldson
due process analysis, the quid pro quo theory, the right to treatment exists
regardless of whether the basis for confinement is concern for the welfare
of the individual or for the protection of society.
75
Once a right to treatment was found to exist, the court had the means
of finding that hospital officials were liable under section 1983 for depriva-
tion of that right, thereby providing the patient with an important means
of recourse for the inadequate care he had received. 74 The court's holding
implied that an official's personal liability extends to a broad range of
activities. 75 However, if the decision is read in relation to the narrow
facts of the case, such a conclusion as to officials' liability may not be
reached. The court declared that the jury could have concluded that plain-
prevention of harm to others, the provision of treatment to those who need it, and the
relief of troubled families having the burden of disabled members. In essence, the
mentally ill are confined basically as a quarantine measure. Id. at 80.
70. For recent review of the theoretical bases for confinement contained in
statutes, see Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1212.
71. If the concern is solely for the welfare of the individual, and if the subject is
capable of determining whether or not treatment is in his own best interest, there
would be no reason for the state to make the commitment decision. See Note, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288,
1295 (1966).
72. Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1212. For examples of statutes
requiring a finding of incapacity, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.070 (1971); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5125 (Cum. Supp. 1970) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467 (Supp. 1974).
73. 493 F.2d at 521. See note 42 supra.
74. In holding the appellee's attending physicians personally liable for the depriva-
tion of the constitutional right to treatment, the Donaldson court rejected the conten-
tion that the discretionary nature of the physicians' function conferred upon them
absolute immunity in their capacity as state officials. Id. at 529-30. Announcing that
granting state officials absolute immunity would emasculate section 1983 since state
officials are its primary targets, the court recognized a qualified immunity, applicable
only when acts were done in good faith in the exercise of an official's discretionary
function. 493 F.2d at 530, quoting Adamian v. University of Nev., 359 F. Supp. 825,
834 (D. Nev. 1973). See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
75. The court declared:
In summary, we hold that where a nondangerous patient is involuntarily
civilly committed to a state mental hopsital, the only constitutionally permissible
purpose of confinement is to provide treatment, and that such a patient has a
constitutional right to such treatment as will help him to be cured or to improve
his mental condition.
493 F.2d at 527.
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tiff's constitutional rights had been violated by actions of the defendants
which obstructed his release,76 thereby implying that the decision may not
be rested solely upon the lack of treatment. In the future, if a mental
patient with a similar status were to bring a section 1983 action against
hospital administrators, relying solely upon their failure to provide ade-
quate treatment as the predicate for the action, he may not be able to base
his allegations squarely upon Donaldson because of this factual distinction.
Further, a section 1983 action for damages undertaken by an individual
or small group of patients on their own behalves, as in Donaldson, will
bring relief only to those patients involved in the suit. As such, the action
taken by an individual patient against his hospital officials will aid only
those patients capable of undertaking such litigation, or fortunate enough
to have someone initiate litigation on their behalves. 77 Such a limited class
of plaintiffs is not likely to bring any major improvements in the overall
system of public mental health care.
In addition, individual damage actions against hospital staff may
impede the improvement of the care that the multitude of state mental
patients receive, their threat discouraging qualified medical personnel from
working in public mental institutions. 78  Holding hospital officials indi-
vidually liable for the lack of treatment can only exacerbate the staffing
problems of the state institutions.
The major impact of the Donaldson decision will be its role in estab-
lishing a theoretical basis upon which actions designed to raise the level of
treatment received by all of the patients in state mental institutions can
proceed. The need for such relief is widely recognized and needs no
further elaboration here.79 As to the fulfilling of this need, commentators
upon the legal right to treatment agree that any meaningful change in the
plight of state mental patients will have to come from the legislature.
80
Cases undertaken in the future such as Whitree v. State,8 ' where a
mental patient was awarded $300,000 in damages against the State of
New York, may use the Donaldson analysis in support of an absolute
76. Id. at 526.
77. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cil. L. REV. 742, 751
(1969). Many mental patients are unaware of any right to treatment, while those
that are aware of their rights can rarely afford a lawyer. Id. For general problems
involved in tort litigation undertaken by mental patients, see Birnbaum, A Rationale
for the Right, 57 GEO. L.J. 752, 756-57 n.20 (1969).
78. There is a need to get more qualified personnel by making public mental
health practice financially competitive with private practice. See Birnbaum, supra
note 79, at 773. See also Rouse v. Cameion, 373 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
79. For a detailed analysis of the present state of public mental health facilities,
see generally R. ROCK, supra note 69; F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW (rev. ed. 1971).
80. For example, one writer has argued that the basic problem is the allocation
of insufficient resources by the legislature, a problem which the courts are helpless to
remedy. Bazelon, Foreword - Symposium - The Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J.
673, 676 (1969).
81. 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. N.Y. 1968).
11
North: Constitutional Law - Mental Health - A Patient Involuntary Civill
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
